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1  Introduction 
The economic growth in China since the late 1970s has been spectacular. With an 
average annual GDP growth of almost 10% for  25 years, China has outpaced many 
developing countries and become one of the largest economic powers in the world. 
Accompanied by a moderate population growth, the GDP per capita increased 7 times 
from 153 USD in 1978 to 1067 USD in 2003 (constant 2000 US$).
1 This overall progress 
has made tremendous strides towards reducing poverty, helping to lift 400 million 
Chinese out of extreme poverty since 1981, which is by far the fastest and largest rate of 
poverty reduction ever recorded (World Development Report, 2005). 
However, the unprecedented growth performance was accompanied by an 
increasing regional disparity. The western region, which covers more than 70% of the 
total surface and inhabits about 30% of the population, is lagging behind. Two decades 
after the reform, the GDP per capita of most western provinces is less than half of the 
national average. The widening of the regional gap undermines the long term growth 
potential and weakens the social stability of the entire Chinese economy. Combining 
growth with a more balanced distribution of income has become one of the guiding tenets 
of the development plans of the Government of China. In 1999, the Western 
Development Plan was launched to resume the preoccupation of “regional balanced 
growth” and to encourage the catching-up of the western region.   
                                                   
1 Data source: World Development Indicators, 2005.   2 
Infrastructure is at the core of the Western Development Plan. The rapid 
economic development generates large demand for infrastructure facilities. However, 
China’s investment in infrastructure has not kept pace with demand, and the shortage of 
transport facilities has been a major bottleneck that constrains economic growth for a 
long time.
2 Improving infrastructure network is critical to boost the catching-up of the 
lagging western region that suffers disproportionately high transport costs due to both 
their geographic remoteness and the poor infrastructure facilities. 
However, transportation infrastructure investment policies that maximize the 
national growth may not have strong impacts in the west; and those privilege the west 
may not have satisfactory outcomes at the national level. This paper attempts to address 
the question on how to target transportation infrastructure investments and optimize the 
impacts of the limited fiscal resources to encourage the development of the western 
region without unnecessarily compromising the national growth. 
This paper has three objectives i) measuring the role of the transportation 
infrastructure development in different locations on economic performance; ii) evaluating 
the optimal location choice of putting transportation infrastructures to rebalance regional 
growth; and iii) simulating the trade-offs between the effects on maximizing aggregate 
growth and reducing regional disparity to compare the alternative transportation 
infrastructure investment allocation policies.  
Using the panel data at the provincial level in the period of 1978-2003, this paper 
develops the indicator “peripheral degree” to measure the effective remoteness of a 
province to the economic centers to take into account both the effects of distance and 
transport facility development, and studies its role in regional growth determination. The 
empirical analysis simulates the effects of the different transportation infrastructure 
investment allocation and examines the trade-offs between maximizing national growth 
and reducing regional disparities. The results show that additional infrastructure 
investments in coastal region may have the largest impacts on national aggregate growth 
at the expense of a widening regional gap; randomly putting infrastructure in the west 
will not have the optimal effects on enhancing growth or on reducing regional disparity. 
                                                   
2 See Wu (1999).   3 
To effectively rebalance the regional development, it is important to target investments in 
central transportation hubs. Two reasons: first, improving the infrastructure facilities in 
transport hubs most effectively reduces the transport cost and enhances the market access 
of the western region to economic centers; second, investing in central provinces 
encourages their emergence as future economic centers and modifies the geo-economic 
structure mapping of the entire Chinese economy in favor of the remote lagging regions. 
The large infrastructure investments in the recent years would have been more effective 
in increasing national growth and reducing regional disparities if an appropriate amount 
were targeted in the central transportation hubs. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the spectacular growth 
performance, the increasing regional disparities, and the uneven development of 
transportation infrastructures in China. Section 3 studies the role of geo-economic 
position in regional growth determination. Section 4 simulates the induced growth 
impacts of putting transportation infrastructures in different provinces, and identifies the 
optimal investment location for regional balanced growth. Section 5 examines the trade-
offs between maximizing aggregate growth and reducing regional disparity, and 
compares the effectiveness of the alternative transportation infrastructure investment 
policies on western development. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Rapid economic growth, increasing regional disparity and uneven 
development of infrastructure facilities  
Using the panel data at the provincial level in the period of 1978-2003, this 
section provides empirical evidence on the rapid economic growth, the increasing 
regional disparity and the uneven development of infrastructure facilities in China. 
 
2.1 Rapid growth of the Chinese economy 
The Chinese economy has grown rapidly since the reforms in 1978. With an 
average annual GDP growth of 9.5%, which translated to an 8% annual growth in per 
capita terms, the size of the economy has increased more than 9 times from 1978 to 2003. 
Such extraordinary growth performance significant outpaced that of many countries, 
including most South-East Asian countries that also enjoyed a miraculous growth (Table 
1).    4 
Table 1: GDP growth rate of some countries 
   Average annual GDP growth rate (%) 
   (1978-2003) 
China   9.5 
Korea, Rep.  6.84 
Vietnam   6.57 
Malaysia   6.38 
Thailand   6.17 
Indonesia   5.56 
United States   3.08 
Philippines   2.95 
Japan   2.71 
     
High income  2.8 
Upper middle income  2.35 
Lower middle income   3.92 
Low income  4.25 
World  2.91 
Data source: World Development Indicators, 2005. 
 
All provinces grew rapidly with an annual growth rate of at least 6% (table 2).
3 
With a double-digit annual growth rate, some coastal provinces, such as Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong, increased their real GDP per capita more 
than 12 times in 25 years. Guangdong, Shanxi and Ningxia shared the similar 
development level in 1978, while thanks to the extraordinary economic performance  in 
the past 25 years, the GDP per capita of Guangdong was more than twice that of its two 
inland partners in 2003.
  
 
                                                   
3 Chinese provinces are classified into three categories: coastal, central, and west. The coastal region 
includes Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan; the central region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi; the 
western region includes Nei Mongol, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xizang. The central region and the western region are considered as the inland 
regions. See annex 1 for more details. In this study, we exclude Xizang and Hainan (an island without 
direct highways/railways connections to the mainland) from the sample for their special characteristics.   5 
Table 2: Provincial GDP Per Capita and Annual Growth Rate 
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and author’s calculations. The data of Chongqing are included in 
Sichuan for better coherence. We exclude Hainan and Xizang because of their special characteristics. 
Since the mid 1990s, all the coastal provinces have become richer than the inland 
provinces (graph 1). Among the inland provinces, the remote western provinces lag 
further behind and lose their standing in the relative income ladder (see for example, 
78-84 85-90 91-97 98-03 79-84 85-90 91-97 98-03 79-03
Coastal region
Beijing 1531 2444 4141 6832 7.65% 5.72% 9.14% 7.03% 7.46%
Tianjin 1403 2145 3401 6623 7.36% 4.16% 10.45% 9.95% 8.08%
Hebei 421 696 1342 2571 6.25% 6.74% 12.40% 8.79% 8.70%
Liaoning 786 1348 2181 3714 6.71% 6.55% 8.78% 8.59% 7.70%
Shanghai 2956 4519 7690 13766 6.13% 4.96% 10.96% 7.46% 7.52%
Jiangsu 562 1122 2376 4789 9.39% 9.07% 13.69% 10.01% 10.67%
Zhejiang 478 991 2213 4454 11.75% 8.39% 15.07% 9.86% 11.42%
Fujian 369 695 1638 3286 9.88% 8.56% 15.49% 8.59% 10.83%
Shandong 410 737 1541 3064 9.46% 6.67% 13.73% 9.91% 10.09%
Guangdong 479 963 2260 4078 8.63% 10.99% 13.72% 8.30% 10.54%
Central region
Shanxi 446 712 1106 1847 8.50% 4.33% 8.64% 7.98% 7.41%
Jilin 470 840 1395 2486 8.33% 6.66% 9.66% 8.44% 8.33%
Heilongjiang 652 953 1440 2422 5.86% 5.22% 7.41% 8.30% 6.73%
Anhui 312 550 939 1754 9.31% 5.39% 11.94% 7.45% 8.66%
Jiangxi 346 568 1030 1885 7.61% 6.61% 11.33% 8.54% 8.64%
Henan 307 529 932 1695 9.38% 6.33% 11.02% 8.09% 8.80%
Hubei 436 750 1283 2424 9.31% 5.87% 11.10% 8.48% 8.78%
Hunan 345 536 880 1558 6.42% 5.67% 9.79% 8.11% 7.59%
Western region
Nei Monggol 408 728 1162 2067 8.92% 6.89% 8.57% 9.95% 8.58%
Guangxi 265 375 717 1242 5.32% 4.88% 12.00% 7.68% 7.65%
Sichuan 323 550 914 1575 8.32% 6.40% 9.58% 8.29% 8.20%
Guizhou 224 375 550 864 9.49% 4.90% 6.97% 7.36% 7.17%
Yunnan 275 476 791 1255 7.68% 7.79% 8.28% 6.22% 7.52%
Shaanxi 346 609 953 1626 6.62% 7.64% 8.13% 8.41% 7.72%
Gansu 376 636 1018 1700 4.30% 8.36% 7.86% 8.07% 7.17%
Qinghai 465 691 935 1516 4.97% 4.17% 6.16% 8.68% 6.00%
Ningxia 429 720 1051 1744 6.34% 6.83% 7.18% 7.90% 7.07%
Xinjiang 404 739 1291 1960 8.94% 8.06% 8.90% 5.97% 8.00%
Average GDP per capita (yuan 1978) Average annual GDP per capita growth rate  6 
Chen and Fleisher, 1996 ; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999 ; Lee, 2000 ; Kim and Knaap, 2001 ; 
Hu, 2002 ; Wu, 2002 ; Luo, 2003;  Aziz and Duenwald, 2003).
4  
Graph 1 Widening development gap between coastal provinces and inland provinces 
 1978-2003 (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai excluded)  
 
2.2 Widening regional development gap and twin-peak emergence  
The unprecedented economic growth and poverty reduction in China have been 
accompanied by rapidly increasing inequality. At the sub-national level, the fruits of 
economic growth have not been evenly shared across the society. The ratio of average 
income of the richest decile of the population to that of the poorest decile has increased 
from 7 times in 1981 to 18 times in 2001 (Ravallion and Chen, 2004). The Gini 
coefficient increased 50% from 31 to 45 (graph 2). Rising inequality, which will result in 
the sub-optimal allocation of resources, will weaken the long-term growth potential. 
Using panel data of Chinese provinces of 1981-2001, Ravallion and Chen (2004) argue 
                                                   
4 Despite the rapid absolute growth compared with most economies worldwide, the inland provinces 
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that the increasing inequality in opportunities will engender non-satisfaction, and 
undermine the social unity of the entire China. 
Data source: Ravallion and Chen (2004) The national poverty measure is a population weighted means of 
the poverty measures in rural and in urban areas. The rural poverty line is 850 yuan per person per year in 
2002, deflated by rural CPI; and the urban poverty line is 1200 yuan per person per year in 2002, deflated 
by urban CPI. The Gini coefficients here show the national income inequality without adjustments for cost 
of living difference in rural and urban areas. 
What leads to the rapid increase in inequality? Many studies argue that, although 
intra-regional inequality (mainly between rural and urban areas) is still significant, the 
inter-regional development gap between the coast and inland becomes more and more 
important (see for example, Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Yao & Zhang, 2001). Suppose there 
is no intra-provincial inequality – each individual has the same income level that equals 
to the average level of the province where he or she lives. Based on the Theil index 
decomposition, the intra-regional inequality (between different provinces) represents for 
more than three quarters of the total inequality in 1978; while less than half in 2003 
(graph 3A). Or, the intra-regional inequality decreases 50%, and the inter-regional 
inequality between the coast and the inland regions triples. 
Graph 3 : The regional inequalities in China (1978-2003) 
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Graph 2: China’s poverty and inequality   8 
3A: Theil index decomposition (Coastal vs. inland regions)  
 











































coast (pop weighted) inland (pop weighted) national (pop weighted)  9 
Based on the changes in Gini coefficients, the results of graph 3B echo that the 
widening regional gap between the coast and the inland is a major reason that leads to an 
increase in inequality at the national level.
  5   At the sub-national level, inequalities 
decreased inside the coastal region and stayed almost unchanged inside the inland region.  
If each province is weighted by its population size, the value of the Gini coefficient 
decreases in the early 1980s and increases afterwards (with a slight trend downwards in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s).
6 We argue that the Household Responsibility System, 
which was implemented at the beginning of the reform, played a critical role in 
increasing the productivity in the agricultural sector. In general, the poor provinces were 
specialized in the agricultural production to a larger extent, and enjoyed more benefits 
from the agricultural reform. However, subject  to various constraints, the increase in 
agricultural productivity decelerated since the mid 1980s. The rapid development of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, which were more concentrated in relatively rich provinces, 
contributed to the widening the regional disparity.  
The difference in annual growth results in the modification of the relative 
rankings of provincial development level. Here, we define the relative real GDP per 




























 If  t i yr,  is superior to 1, the development level of province i is higher than the national 
average in year t; if  t i yr,  is inferior to 1, the development level of province i is lower 
than the national average in year t. Normalizing the GDP per capita of province i by the 
                                                   
5 Graph 3B shows the Gini coefficient of the GDP per capita across provinces, taking each province as an 
individual and assuming no intra-provincial inequality. Graph 1 shows the Gini coefficient of the household 
income (Ravallion and Chen, 2004). The value of the Gini coefficient in graph 1 is higher than that in graph 
3B. One major reason that leads to this difference is the intra-provincial (mainly rural-urban) inequality.  
This paper examines the disparities across provinces, and neglects the inequality at the sub-provincial level. 
6 If each province is assigned the same weight, the value of the overall inequality is higher but the trend is 
similar. With a slightly longer period of decrease in inequality till the late 1980s, the Gini index value 
increases since then. Results are available upon request. 
28 ... 3 , 2 , 1 = i    10 
average national GDP per capita, we find that the three municipalities always have a 
much higher relative development level than the other provinces – Tianjin’s development 
level is at least 2.5 times the national average, Beijing around 3 times, and Shanghai 
around 6 times. Given their special characteristics (such as high urbanization rates, 
special economic policies, etc.), we separate them from the others. 
Using Epanechnikov Kernel density
7, graph 4 describes the growth trajectories of 
the Chinese provinces,
 where the width of the arrows in the graph is proportional to the 
number of the provinces that follow the particular development trajectory (the change in 
group rankings).
 8  If the relative development level of many provinces is around 1, that is 
to say, near the national average level, the distribution is egalitarian; if the relative 
development level of a large number of provinces concentrates in one extreme and that of 
the others concentrate in the other extreme, the regional development is unequal.
9 Our 
results show that, apart from the three municipalities, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the 
relative development levels of the provinces tended to cluster around the national average, 
few provinces were much poorer or richer than the others. Only the three provinces 
(Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Heilongjiang) had a relative GDP per capital ratio higher than 1.3; 
all the other 22 provinces clustered together with a peak value around the national 
average level
10; however, in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the number of provinces 
whose development level is around the national average shrank, the poor group clustered 
together with a peak value around 0.65, and four provinces, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
                                                   



















) ( , 
where  N  stands for the number of observations, h  the parameter of smoothness, and  ) (• K the function 
of Kernel where the integral is equal to unity.  
8 For the sake of simplicity and to smooth out the impact of short-term shocks, we examine the distribution 
of the provincial average relative GDP per capita of the first and the second half of our period of study (ie. 
1978-1990 and 1991-2003). The change of annual relative provincial GDP per capita in the period of 1978-
2003, is available from the author upon request.  
9 See Ben-David (1994; 1997), Quah (1996; 1997), Cozzi (1997). 
10  The values of the relative GDP per capita of three municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, are at 
least 2.5 times of that of the national average. Hence, the mean value of the relative GDP per capita of the 
other 25 provinces illustrated in the graph is less than 1.   11 
Guangdong and Liaoning developed as the rich group.
11 Graph 4 shows that (i) at the end 
of our period of study, all provinces belonging to the poorest group were inland provinces 
(most of them are western provinces); and all provinces belonging to the rich group were 
costal provinces
12; (ii) during this period, all provinces that suffered a relative decline in 
rankings were inland provinces (among them, most are western provinces), and all the 
provinces that caught up were coastal provinces.  
The Chinese provinces converged to different clubs –  the coastal provinces 
clustered together to from the rich club, while the inland provinces declined to be the 
periphery. The emergence of the two-peaks, rich and poor, vividly demonstrates the 




                                                   
11 The values of the relative GDP per capita of four provinces, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Liaoning, 
are greater than 1.4 times the national average. 
12 The three municipalities are already separated as the richest group from the other provinces. For the 
reasons of readability, we do not illustrate these three provinces in Graph 4. 




























































        
Graph 4: Growth trajectories of Chinese provinces (1978-2003) 
Note: Coastal provinces are marked in italic; western provinces are underlined. 
 
   13 
Why has the regional disparities widened after the reform? Many studies, see for 
example Yang (2002) and Kanbur and Zhang (2002), suggest that the gradual extension 
of the open-door policies from the coast to the inland is one of the major reasons that 
contribute to the widening of the regional gap.
14  Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the coastal provinces attracted disproportionately higher shares of foreign investments 
and trade, and developed as domestic economic centers. As shown in graph 5, in 1980, 
the  first Special Economic Zones were established in four cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou and Xiamen) in the coastal provinces Guangdong and Fujian, to attract foreign 
direct investments. These two provinces are hometowns of many oversea Chinese 
investors. In order to scale up the success to the entire coastal region, the open-door 
policy extended to 14 coastal cities in 1984, to the delta of Yangtze, the delta of the Pearl 
River, and the delta of Minnan in 1985, and to Hainan in 1988. These special economic 
zones and coastal open areas had superior tax treatments and preferential resource 
allocations (Litwack & Qian, 1998).  The open-door policies were further extended to 
many inland cities in the 1990s. This gradual extension of the open-door policies give the 
coastal regional tremendous first-mover advantages on attracting investments and 
generating growth, putting the non-coastal provinces at significant disadvantages (Fujita 
and Hu, 2001). Provinces with good access to the market are better suited to be platforms 
for producing manufactured exports, and are more attractive to foreign direct investments 
(Fujita and Hu, 2001 ; Zhang, 2001; Demurger et al., 2002; Jones, Li and Owen, 2003 ; 
Gao, 2004 ; Fu, 2004 ; Wen, 2004). For example, in 2003, the coastal provinces attract 
around 85% of the total foreign direct investments and represent more than 90% of the 
total foreign trade.
15 
                                                   
14 See also Lin (1995) and Hu and Tan (1996) for a further discussion on the determinants of regional 
disparities. 
15 Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004.   14 
Graph 5: Spatial Gradualism of the open-door policies in China 
 
Source : Luo (2003). 
 
The attractiveness of a location to firms are not geographically-neutral. The 
proximity or easy access to economic centers strongly favors regional growth (Fleisher 
and Chen, 1997; Demurger, 2001). We argue that the favorable geographic conditions 
and the proximity to markets are the most important factors that lead to the emergence of 
the coastal provinces as economic centers.
16 Past experience, for example the “Third 
Front Program”, shows that the investments distorted to geographically remote regions 
without appropriate transport facilities are costly and unlikely to be profitable. The 
proximity to markets (Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) is one major factor that 
contributes to the success of the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian. 
Demurger et al. (2002) argue that the effects of the geographic position are greater than 
the preferential policies in encouraging the rapid growth of the coastal provinces. In the 
western region, the higher transport costs resulted from the unfavorable topographic 
features and the distance to coastal centers largely hinder economic growth. The 
                                                   
16 See Krugman (1991) for discussions on the role of first nature and second nature on regional growth.   15 
underdevelopment of transport facilities limits interregional trade and lowers profit 
margins. Effective investments in transport networks and in communications, which may 
alleviate geographical obstacles to trade, are particularly critical to the economic 
performance of the remote areas. 
2.3 Disparities in the distribution of transportation infrastructure facilities 
Rapid economic development results in a surging demand for infrastructure. The 
transportation infrastructure facilities have long been in shortage in China. In 1978, for 
the entire China, in average, there were less than 6 meters railways in operation and 100 
meters highways per squared kilometer!
17  Through various channels, the 
underdevelopment of infrastructures hinders growth. Merchandise had to wait for weeks 
(or sometimes months) before being shipped because of the limited capacity of railway 
transportation. Information could not be exchanged timely because of the insufficiency 
(or inexistence) of telephone lines and internet services. In particular, the infrastructure 
development is of great importance for the export-led development strategy. For example, 
large investments in transport facilities (in particular in port capacity) have played an 
important role in the rapid development of the Special Economic Zones. In the absence of 
the upgraded infrastructure facilities, their competitiveness in attracting FDI would have 
been much weakened. The remote provinces suffer disproportionately from the shortage 
in transport facilities. The high transport costs (and the unpredictability of the delivery 
time) largely contribute to the fragmentation of the domestic market. The costs for 
transporting merchandises from inland exporter to the coast represent a high ratio of the 
total transport costs (Carruthers, Bajpai and Hummels, 2003). The insufficiency of 
infrastructure facilities reduces the competitiveness and productivities of the inland 
firms.
18 
                                                   
17 Data source: China Statistical Yearbooks. The length of highways refers to the length of highways which 
are built in conformity with the grades specified by the highway engineering standard formulated by the 
Ministry of Communications, and have been formally checked and accepted by the departments of 
highways and put into use. The length of railways in operation refers to the total length of the trunk line 
under passenger and freight transportation (including both full operation and temporary operation). Here, 
we exclude Xizang and Hainan from the sample. 
18 See Li (2005) for econometric evidence on the social surplus gain of infrastructure investments in China.   16 
The infrastructure facilities are not only insufficient, but also unevenly distributed 
– take the density of highways and/or railways per square kilometers as an example.
19 
Suppose that highways (railways) distribute evenly inside each province. Graph 6 shows 
that a quarter of the total length of highways (railways) concentrate in the 10% surface 
that are best endowed with infrastructures. Although infrastructure investments jumped in 
the late 1990s, less than 10% of the total length of highways (railways) locates in the 
40% surface that is the most poorly endowed in transport facilities. This uneven 
distribution changes hardly over time.  
Graph 6 Uneven distributions of highways (railways) in Chinese provinces 
Note: The figure groups provinces by quintile from poorest (quintile 1) to richest (quintile 5), with quintile 
5 divided into two deciles. 
 
In the pre-reform period, the distribution of infrastructure investments mainly 
depended on the central development strategy planning. The emphasis on the 
                                                   
19 Here, we focus on the density of the highways/railways, and neglect the inland waterways and air 
transports and other infrastructure facilities. If the “density” of highways/railways is measured in per capita 
basis, the regional disparity of the endowments of infrastructure facilities is different. For example, given 
the low density of population, some northwest provinces with a very sparse transport network, have a 















































































quintile 1 quintile 2 quintile 3 quintile 4 quintile 5 (1) quintile 5 (2)  17 
development of the heavy industries disproportionately favored the investments in 
extending the railway network over upgrading the existing roads. A large part of 
infrastructure investments was disproportionately allocated through the central planning 
system to the northeastern provinces, where concentrated the (state-owned) heavy 
industries.
20  For the entire China, infrastructure facilities were in great shortage. Since 
the 1980s, driven by the market forces, large investments have been switched towards 
building roads and upgrading the existing system. In the 1990s, infrastructure 
investments were reasserted as one major priority for long-term development and 
articulated in the Western Development program (State Council, 2000). The central 
government increased commitment of budgetary resources to the western provinces. 
During the first two years of the Western Development Plan (2000-2001), more than 20 
large scale investment projects begun in the western region, with a total budgeted 
investment of over 400 billion yuan, almost 5 percent of national GDP. The transport and 
energy related projects are the major components of the infrastructure investments of the 
Western Development Plan.
21 In particular, highways development is the priority of the 
transport projects. In 2000-2001, more than 130000 kilometers highways were built or 
upgraded to the highway engineering standards in the western provinces.
22  
There exists a strong association between the economic development level and the 
density of the transport network. The coastal provinces have witnessed rapid 
improvements in transport facilities (especially highways). For example, the transport 
network in Guangdong, one of the most dynamic coastal provinces, has improved 
drastically – the density of highways more than doubled from less than 3000 kilometers 
per 10000 square kilometers to more than 6000.  However, the shortage of infrastructure 
facilities remained as a major bottleneck for growth, especially for the remote western 
provinces to integrate to the domestic and international market  (graph 7).
                                                   
20 See also Naughton (2004). 
21 The WDP covers a broad range of sectors, such irrigation, urban construction, and environmental 
restoration, etc. 
22 Data source: China Statistical Yearbooks.   18 
Graph 7 Densities of railways and highways in Chinese provinces 
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Can putting transportation infrastructures in the west help balancing regional 
growth? Past experience shows that simply throwing money in lagging regions will not 
efficiently fuel economic development. In the western region, infrastructure investment 
and maintenance costs are high and economic profitability is low because of the 
disadvantageous geographic, topological, and climatic features, and the fragmented and 
dispersed economic activity. Given the high marginal return of infrastructure investments 
in other regions, putting all investments in the west may not be the optimal choice. 
Privileging the development of the intra-regional transportation facilities may fail to link 
the west to the domestic economic centers and render its economy more inward-looking.  
In the following sections, we will examine the impacts of the infrastructure development 
in each province on the catching-up of the western region, and simulate the tradeoffs 
between maximizing economic growth and reducing regional disparities of the alternative 
regional infrastructure investment policies. 
3  Role of the geo-economic position in regional growth performance 
Given the fact that climate and topology play an important role in influencing 
disease burdens and agricultural productivity, and location in transport costs, it is not 
surprising that the distribution of economic activities is spatially uneven (Gallup et al., 
1999; Henderson et al., 2000). The homogeneity among the adjacent regions shows that 
geographical position may be an important factor that conditions economic growth, as 
detailed in Baumont et al. (2000) and Davis and Weinstein (1997).  
The attractiveness of a geographic position is determined not only  by its 
proximity to economic centres, but also by its transport convenience. It is the transport 
costs, which is a function of distance and the transport facility development level of the 
itinerary that links the region to the economic centres (major trade partners), that 
condition regional growth. This section constructs an indicator “peripheral degree” to 
measure the effective remoteness of the province in question to economic centers (in our 
case, the coastal provinces), and examines its role in regional growth.
23  
3.1 Construction of “peripheral degree” 
                                                   
23 This indicator “peripheral degree” was developed in Luo (2004).   20 
We consider the coastal provinces as the domestic economic centers. The 
influence of the demand from a partner province on the economic performance of the 
province in question is positively correlated to the economic mass of the former. To take 
into account the relative importance of the economic size of different coastal provinces, 
we define its peripheral degree, noted as PD , as the weighted sum of the adjusted 
distance between this province and all the coastal provinces.
24 To capture the relative 
importance of the effective remoteness, the adjusted distance between the province in 
question (i) and a coastal province ( j ) is weighted by the economic mass of the latter 
relative to that of coastal provinces in total. The reason lies in that the farther away is the 
province in question from a great size coastal province, the more serious is the 
disadvantage that it suffers from its geographical position. In other words, we suppose 
that, other things being equal, the structure of demand is similar among different regions, 
namely, the percentage of demand satisfied by local production (and thus that satisfied by 
the production of other provinces) is the same, as suggested by Courcier and Laffay 
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where  t i PD ,  represents the peripheral degree of province i at time t;  t ij DistA ,  represents 
the real distance between province i and province  j  adjusted by the development level 
of infrastructure of the itinerary that connects these two provinces at time t, namely the 
adjusted distance between province i  and province  j  at time t  suggested by Luo 
(2001)
25;  t j GDP ,  represents the real GDP of province  j  at time t. Here,  j  represents the 
coastal provinces, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong.
26 
3.2 Relation between “peripheral degree” and regional economic growth 
                                                   
24 In the case of China, all important harbors situate in coastal provinces. The relative remoteness to coastal 
provinces is positively correlated to the relative remoteness to international markets. 
25 See annex 2 for the construction of the adjusted distance. 
26 We exclude Hainan from our sample for its unique island characteristics.   21 
The provinces close to economic centers have higher growth rate (graph 8). As 
Chinese economy becomes more and more market-oriented, the geographical position 
plays a more and more important role in regional development. At the beginning of the 
economic reform, in the late 1970's, Chinese economy was distorted by the inefficient 
allocation of resources and regional development level did not well reflect the 
development capacity.
  27  As the economic reform deepens, regional comparative 
advantages become an important factor that determines the production structure. Favored 
by the better access to foreign markets and benefited from the opening-up policies, 
coastal provinces grow much faster than inland ones (Woo, 1998). Given the 
geographical economic position of a province will not modify much in the absence of 
fundamental external policy change, it is reasonable to predict that the core-peripheral 
development pattern will continue. Appropriate policies may be important to rebalance 
regional development. 
Graph 8. Relation between peripheral degree and annual growth rate of Chinese 
provinces (1978-2003) 
 
                                                   
27 Pursuing the sake of "political security" and being aware of the "critical threat from the foreign 
capitalists", the Chinese government allocated a great deal of its industrial investment in the inland 
provinces during its "planned-economy" period. Subordinated to the "political goal", the comparative 
advantages of various provinces were not well considered before economic reform.   22 
Using the panel data of "Chinese Statistic Yearbooks", "Comprehensive Statistic 
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China", and the distance data from "Map of 
communication facilities of China", this section studies the determination of annual 
growth of Chinese provinces during the period of 1979-2003, emphasizing the role of 
geographical position. In light of the Solow-Swan growth theory, we estimate the growth 
determination at the provincial level, introducing the independent variables  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  (the 
initial GDP per capita level),  ) ln( ,t i PD (peripheral degree),  ) ln( ,t i S (fixed investment rate), 
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Table 3 – Provincial growth determination – the role of peripheral degree 
(1978-2003) 
  Dependent variable :  ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y  
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  -0.049***  -0.065***  -0.056*** 
   (-5.00)  (-5.6)  (-5.07) 
    -0.084***  -0.075*** 
     (-2.54)  (-2.34) 
      0.050*** 
       -2.31 
      -1.206*** 
       (-6.92) 
Constant  0.491***  1.324***  1.166*** 
   -6.3  -3.93  -3.57 
        
R square  0.4844  0.4895  0.5681 
Observation number  700  700  700 
Note: t-students are in brackets. * significant in 10% ; ** significant in 5% ; *** significant in 
1%.  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  stands for initial real GDP per capita in logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i PD peripheral 
degree in logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i s  physical investment ratio in logarithmic form;  ) ln( ,t i n  
population growth rate in logarithmic form. For simplicity, the time dummies are not represented 
in the table. 
The results of table 3 suggest the liabilities of being remote to economic centers. 
The effective remoteness of a province to the economic centers not only lowers its 
economic growth rate, but also reduces its long term development capacity. Distance 
                                                   
28 See annex 4 for details of the growth determination estimations. 
) ln( 1 , − t i y
) ln( ,t i PD
) ln( ,t i s
) ln( ,t i n  23 
between two locations will not change over time. Without major targeted improvements 
in transport facilities, the lagging western region will suffer lower performance. 
4  Targeted transportation infrastructure investments and policy 
alternatives 
The key question we will address here is where to put transportation 
infrastructures can most effectively rebalance regional growth. Many studies suggest a 
strong correlation between public capital and regional development (Aschauer, 1989; 
Mundell, 1990; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996). Fernald (1999; 2004), Fabrizio et al. 
(2005), and Li (2005) argue the causations from transport network improvements to 
productivity gains. Fan and Zhang (2004) identify the specific role of rural infrastructure 
in regional productivities in China. Infrastructure facilities in a province can directly 
promote local growth through forward and backward linkages, and indirectly encourage 
the development of other provinces through reducing transport costs. In this section, we 
will simulate the impacts of hypothetical transport facility improvements in each 
province, and rank their effectiveness in promoting growth at the national and regional 
levels  to evaluate the potential trade-offs between maximizing aggregate growth and 
minimizing regional disparities. 
4.1 Rationales of simulations 
The peripheral degree, by construction, is determined by the distance between the 
province in question and the national economic center and by the infrastructure 
development level of the transit economies. A similar improvement of transportation 
facilities in different provinces leads to different modifications of peripheral degree in 
different provinces. As shown in the following box, an increase of transportation network 
density in one province does not only lead to the change of its own peripheral degree; it 
also leads to that of the other concerned provinces. 
29 
                                                   
29 As to a province i , all modification of the transportation network locates in a province v , which 
situates in its itinerary to the coastal provinces, will lead to a modification of its peripheral degree. As to a 
province v, an improvement of its transportation infrastructure favors all provinces i that cross it to join 
the coastal provinces. The heavier the traffic is that transits through province v, in which case province v 
is considered as a transportation hub, the more provinces will benefit from its transportation facility 
improvement, and the greater are its effects on the reduction of the peripheral degree of the concerned 
provinces. See annex 3 for details on the methodologies of simulations.   24 
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We will simulate the impacts of the hypothetical transport facility improvements 
in each province in the decentralization scenario and the centralization scenario. 
 
4.2 Decentralization scenario 
 
In the decentralization scenario – if the provincial governments provide a large 
share of the infrastructure investment funding –  the capacity of a province to make 
additional investments is closely related to its existing infrastructure endowment 
(measured by transport network densities).  We examine the growth effects of a 10% 
increase in transport network density in each province.
30  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
30 Under this hypothesis, the new transport network density in each province equals 110% of its real density: 
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Table 4 – Regional growth induced by 10% hypothetical transport network density increase in different 
provinces (province in question included) 
National    Coastal    Inland    West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3  
Qinghai  0.01    Shanxi  …    Qinghai  0.03    Jilin  … 
Xinjiang  0.01    Nei Monggol  …    Xinjiang  0.04    Heilongjiang  … 
Nei Monggol  0.05    Jilin  …    Nei Monggol  0.13    Qinghai  0.08 
Ningxia  0.11    Heilongjiang  …    Ningxia  0.26    Xinjiang  0.09 
Gansu  0.14    Guangxi  …    Gansu  0.34    Nei Monggol  0.32 
Yunnan  0.18    Sichuan  …    Yunnan  0.44    Ningxia  0.68 
Heilongjiang  0.22    Guizhou  …    Heilongjiang  0.53    Tianjin  0.78 
Guangxi  0.27    Yunnan  …    Guangxi  0.63    Gansu  0.89 
Guizhou  0.29    Shaanxi  …    Guizhou  0.69    Yunnan  1.14 
Jilin  0.53    Gansu  …    Tianjin  0.82    Jiangxi  1.18 
Shanxi  0.69    Qinghai  …    Beijing  1.24    Beijing  1.19 
Shaanxi  0.70    Ningxia  …    Jilin  1.27    Guangxi  1.68 
Sichuan  0.78    Xinjiang  …    Shanxi  1.64    Guizhou  1.83 
Tianjin  1.21    Jiangxi  0.48    Shaanxi  1.66    Shanxi  2.11 
Jiangxi  1.36    Anhui  0.56    Fujian  1.81    Fujian  2.22 
Beijing  2.04    Tianjin  1.62    Sichuan  1.85    Liaoning  2.29 
Anhui  2.61    Hubei  1.80    Jiangxi  2.62    Shanghai  3.00 
Hunan  3.37    Hunan  1.84    Shanghai  3.01    Zhejiang  3.54 
Fujian  3.88    Henan  1.90    Liaoning  4.36    Shandong  4.13 
Liaoning  4.09    Beijing  2.83    Zhejiang  4.82    Jiangsu  4.16 
Hubei  4.32    Liaoning  4.24    Guangdong  5.05    Shaanxi  4.37 
Henan  4.50    Fujian  5.80    Shandong  5.11    Sichuan  4.55 
Shanghai  4.60    Shanghai  6.20    Jiangsu  5.16    Anhui  4.82 
Guangdong  6.04    Guangdong  7.26    Anhui  5.50    Guangdong  5.22 
Zhejiang  6.51    Zhejiang  8.32    Hunan  5.66    Hebei  5.32 
Hebei  7.63    Hebei  8.95    Hebei  6.73    Hunan  6.31 
Jiangsu  8.87    Jiangsu  12.46    Hubei  7.96    Henan  7.12 
Shandong  9.02    Shandong  12.78    Henan  8.27    Hubei  8.83 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to....0000005. For example, a 10% 
increase in the transport network density in Shandong province leads to a 9.02×10
-4 increase of the growth rate of the 
whole China. Coastal provinces are marked in italic, transport hubs are marked in bold.  
 
Following the simulation methodologies, we calculate the average induced effects 
of putting this additional transportation infrastructure in each province on the growth of 
the entire China and different regions (table 4). The first column "national" shows that if 
the objective is to generate the largest impacts on the (weighted average) growth of the 
entire China, we should put transportation infrastructures in the coastal provinces, in 
particular, in Shandong, Jiangsu, and Hebei.
31 However, such favourable growth effects 
concentrate mainly in the coastal region, as shown the second column "coastal."
32 Even 
though this growth pattern might be an efficient way to maximize national growth, the 
rapid growth in coastal provinces will further widen the regional development gap. 
                                                   
31 Given the economic size of the coastal provinces and their role as economic centers, it is not surprising 
that the improvement of the transportation network in these provinces results in substantial effects on the 
weighted average growth of the entire China. 
32 Here we have not yet counted for the great multiplier effect of infrastructure investment on local growth.   26 
Table 4 bis – Regional growth induced by 10% hypothetical transport network density increase in different 
provinces (province in question excluded) 
National    Coastal    Inland    West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3  
Nei Monggol  ...    Shanxi  ...    Nei Monggol  ...    Nei Monggol  ... 
Heilongjiang  ...    Nei Monggol  ...    Heilongjiang  ...    Jilin  ... 
Yunnan  ...    Jilin  ...    Yunnan  ...    Heilongjiang  ... 
Xinjiang  ...    Heilongjiang  ...    Xinjiang  ...    Yunnan  ... 
Qinghai  0.01    Guangxi  ...    Qinghai  0.02    Xinjiang  ... 
Sichuan  0.02    Sichuan  ...    Sichuan  0.04    Qinghai  0.05 
Guangxi  0.07    Guizhou  ...    Gansu  0.16    Sichuan  0.14 
Gansu  0.07    Yunnan  ...    Guangxi  0.17    Gansu  0.42 
Ningxia  0.08    Shaanxi  ...    Ningxia  0.19    Guangxi  0.49 
Guizhou  0.16    Gansu  ...    Guizhou  0.38    Ningxia  0.51 
Jilin  0.33    Qinghai  ...    Tianjin  0.82    Tianjin  0.78 
Shanxi  0.35    Ningxia  ...    Jilin  0.82    Guizhou  1.08 
Shaanxi  0.40    Xinjiang  ...    Shanxi  0.85    Jiangxi  1.18 
Tianjin  0.77    Jiangxi  0.48    Shaanxi  0.98    Beijing  1.19 
Jiangxi  0.97    Anhui  0.56    Beijing  1.24    Shanxi  2.11 
Beijing  1.26    Tianjin  0.79    Jiangxi  1.72    Fujian  2.22 
Anhui  2.01    Beijing  1.39    Fujian  1.81    Liaoning  2.29 
Hunan  2.75    Hubei  1.80    Shanghai  3.01    Shaanxi  2.82 
Shanghai  2.78    Hunan  1.84    Anhui  4.23    Shanghai  3.00 
Fujian  3.39    Henan  1.90    Hunan  4.32    Zhejiang  3.54 
Liaoning  3.40    Shanghai  2.81    Liaoning  4.36    Shandong  4.13 
Hubei  3.47    Liaoning  2.86    Zhejiang  4.82    Jiangsu  4.16 
Henan  3.53    Fujian  4.95    Guangdong  5.05    Anhui  4.82 
Guangdong  4.89    Guangdong  5.15    Shandong  5.11    Guangdong  5.22 
Zhejiang  5.61    Zhejiang  6.74    Jiangsu  5.16    Hebei  5.32 
Hebei  7.03    Hebei  7.87    Hubei  6.21    Hunan  6.31 
Jiangsu  7.58    Jiangsu  10.49    Henan  6.25    Henan  7.12 
Shandong  7.74    Shandong  10.78    Hebei  6.73    Hubei  8.83 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to....0000005. For example, a 10% 
increase in the transport network density in Shandong province leads to a 7.74×10
-4 increase of the growth rate of the 
whole China when Shandong itself is excluded. Coastal provinces are marked in italic, transport hubs are marked in 
bold.  
In fact, the impacts on national and regional growth of putting transportation 
infrastructure in a province consist of two parts: the impact on the growth of the province 
in question, and the impact on the growth of other provinces.
33 
The rankings of the provinces do not change much when the impacts on its own 
growth are excluded (table 4 bis). Putting transportation infrastructures in the coastal 
provinces and in the central transportation hubs have large impacts not only on the 
growth of themselves but also on the growth of other provinces, which reinforces our 
                                                   
33 To study the effects of an improvement of transportation network density in one province on the growth 
of the other provinces, and verify the robustness of our simulation results, we calculate the same ratios 
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effects of the investment on local growth. If the province v is not a member of the group in question, the 
value of the ratio in table 4 bis is the same as the one in table 4.   27 
arguments that putting transportation infrastructures in Hubei, Henan and Hunan have the 
largest impacts on the growth of the western region. 
The last columns "west" in both table 4 and table 4 bis show that to stimulate the 
economic performance of the western provinces, which are actually lagging behind, we 
should put transportation infrastructures in the central transportation hubs of Hubei, 
Henan, and Hunan.
34 Putting transportation infrastructures in some western provinces 
might yield lower effects on the growth of the entire western region than targeting 
infrastructures in some coastal and central provinces (such as Hebei, Guangdong, and 
Anhui), even though infrastructure investments will strongly stimulate economic growth 
of the hosting provinces. 
4.3 Centralization scenarios 
 
Why the hypothetical additional infrastructure investments in the coastal 
provinces and those in the central transportation hubs have larger impacts? Would their 
higher initial transport network density, which implies a higher level of density increase 
in absolute sense than in the other inland/western provinces, be the major reasons?  What 
will be the rankings of the induced growth effects if the additional infrastructure 
investments allocated to different provinces are not related to their initial transport 
facility development level? For example, in the centralization scenario – if it is the central 
government that provides a large proportion of the policy funding, and a similar amount 
of additional infrastructure investments is to be allocated to different provinces – where 
to put the additional investments can maximize the growth impact in the entire China and 
in different regions? To test the robustness of the argument –  putting transportation 
infrastructures in the coastal provinces maximize national growth and putting 
transportation infrastructures in the central transportation hubs most effectively favours 
the western region –  we will simulate two controlling scenarios  where the additional 
investment is unrelated to the initial transport density of different provinces at the 
absolute levels. 
                                                   
34 Putting transportation infrastructures in these central hubs also have large effects on the growth of the 
inland provinces, as shown in the third columns.   28 
Table 5 – Regional growth induced by hypothetical 10% increase of average national transport network density 
in different provinces (province in question included) 
National    Coastal    Inland    West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3  
Qinghai  0.07    Shanxi  ...    Qinghai  0.17    Jilin  ... 
Xinjiang  0.10    Nei Monggol  ...    Xinjiang  0.24    Heilongjiang  ... 
Ningxia  0.11    Jilin  ...    Tianjin  0.25    Tianjin  0.24 
Yunnan  0.14    Heilongjiang  ...    Beijing  0.27    Beijing  0.26 
Nei Monggol  0.17    Guangxi  ...    Ningxia  0.27    Qinghai  0.43 
Guangxi  0.21    Sichuan  ...    Yunnan  0.33    Xinjiang  0.60 
Guizhou  0.21    Guizhou  ...    Nei Monggol  0.41    Ningxia  0.69 
Gansu  0.24    Yunnan  ...    Guangxi  0.49    Jiangxi  0.73 
Heilongjiang  0.27    Shaanxi  ...    Guizhou  0.49    Shanghai  0.74 
Tianjin  0.37    Gansu  ...    Gansu  0.57    Fujian  0.85 
Shanxi  0.39    Qinghai  ...    Heilongjiang  0.64    Yunnan  0.88 
Beijing  0.44    Ningxia  ...    Fujian  0.70    Nei Monggol  1.02 
Jilin  0.44    Xinjiang  ...    Shanghai  0.75    Liaoning  1.11 
Shaanxi  0.47    Anhui  0.30    Shanxi  0.94    Shanxi  1.20 
Sichuan  0.58    Jiangxi  0.30    Jilin  1.04    Guangxi  1.30 
Jiangxi  0.84    Tianjin  0.49    Shaanxi  1.11    Guizhou  1.30 
Shanghai  1.14    Beijing  0.62    Sichuan  1.37    Gansu  1.48 
Anhui  1.40    Hubei  0.85    Jiangxi  1.63    Zhejiang  1.51 
Fujian  1.49    Hunan  0.85    Guangdong  1.76    Shandong  1.75 
Hunan  1.55    Henan  0.88    Zhejiang  2.06    Guangdong  1.83 
Liaoning  1.97    Shanghai  1.53    Liaoning  2.11    Jiangsu  2.07 
Hubei  2.04    Liaoning  2.04    Shandong  2.18    Anhui  2.58 
Henan  2.09    Fujian  2.22    Jiangsu  2.57    Hebei  2.73 
Guangdong  2.09    Guangdong  2.51    Hunan  2.61    Hunan  2.91 
Zhejiang  2.78    Zhejiang  3.54    Anhui  2.95    Shaanxi  2.91 
Shandong  3.84    Hebei  4.56    Hebei  3.44    Henan  3.30 
Hebei  3.89    Shandong  5.45    Hubei  3.77    Sichuan  3.36 
Jiangsu  4.39    Jiangsu  6.16    Henan  3.83    Hubei  4.19 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to....0000005. For example, a 10% 
increase of average national transport network density in Shandong province leads to a 4.39×10
-4 increase of the 
growth rate of the whole China. Coastal provinces are marked in italic, transport hubs are marked in bold.  
 
First, we will simulate the same increase in absolute density in each province 
disregarding its initial transport facility endowment. Here, suppose this absolute level is 
10 percent of the national average transportation network density.
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Following the same methodologies, we rank the impacts of putting transportation 
infrastructures in different provinces on national and regional growth. The rankings in 
table 5 are similar to those in table  4  –  if the objective of putting transportation 
                                                   
35 If under a strong assumption that the costs of building railways (highways) are similar in each province, 
this scenario actually stands for the case where a same amount of monetary increase (in yuan, for example)  
in infrastructure investments per surface units (per square kilometer) in each province on national growth 
and on regional growth.   29 
infrastructures is to maximize national growth effects, we should invest in coastal 
provinces, such as Jiangsu, Hebei and Shandong. But if the objective is to achieve higher 
growth in inland/western regions, investing in the central transportation hubs (Henan, 
Hubei and Hunan) are most effective. If we consider putting transportation infrastructures 
in western provinces, good choices would be Shaanxi and Sichuan (the western regional 
hubs). 
Table 6 – Regional growth induced by hypothetical 1% increase of national road and railway length in different 
provinces (province in question included) 
National    Coastal    Inland    West 
Province  m v gaeff ) ( 0     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 1     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 2     Province  m v gaeff ) ( 3  
Xinjiang  0.05    Shanxi  …    Xinjiang  0.12    Jilin  … 
Qinghai  0.08    Nei Monggol  …    Qinghai  0.20    Heilongjiang  … 
Nei Monggol  0.12    Jilin  …    Nei Monggol  0.29    Xinjiang  0.31 
Yunnan  0.29    Heilongjiang  …    Yunnan  0.70    Qinghai  0.50 
Gansu  0.44    Guangxi  …    Gansu  1.04    Nei Monggol  0.72 
Heilongjiang  0.47    Sichuan  …    Heilongjiang  1.13    Yunnan  1.85 
Guangxi  0.71    Guizhou  …    Guangxi  1.70    Gansu  2.71 
Sichuan  0.85    Yunnan  …    Sichuan  2.01    Jiangxi  3.47 
Guizhou  0.96    Shaanxi  …    Guizhou  2.29    Guangxi  4.52 
Ningxia  1.29    Gansu  …    Ningxia  3.05    Sichuan  4.94 
Shaanxi  1.86    Qinghai  …    Shaanxi  4.42    Fujian  5.56 
Jilin  1.91    Ningxia  …    Fujian  4.50    Liaoning  6.02 
Shanxi  2.04    Xinjiang  …    Jilin  4.55    Guizhou  6.06 
Jiangxi  4.01    Jiangxi  1.44    Shanxi  4.83    Shanxi  6.17 
Hunan  6.03    Anhui  1.74    Jiangxi  7.74    Ningxia  7.97 
Anhui  8.02    Hunan  3.32    Guangdong  7.91    Guangdong  8.22 
Hubei  8.95    Hubei  3.74    Beijing  9.50    Shandong  9.15 
Guangdong  9.51    Henan  4.28    Hunan  10.14    Beijing  9.29 
Fujian  9.76    Liaoning  11.19    Tianjin  11.09    Tianjin  10.76 
Henan  10.12    Guangdong  11.49    Shandong  11.39    Hunan  11.27 
Liaoning  10.82    Fujian  14.59    Liaoning  11.57    Shaanxi  11.57 
Beijing  16.80    Hebei  19.73    Hebei  14.80    Zhejiang  11.63 
Hebei  16.80    Beijing  23.85    Zhejiang  15.76    Hebei  11.69 
Tianjin  18.35    Tianjin  25.50    Hubei  16.51    Anhui  14.74 
Shandong  20.17    Zhejiang  27.41    Anhui  16.79    Jiangsu  15.75 
Zhejiang  21.39    Shandong  28.66    Henan  18.57    Henan  15.99 
Jiangsu  33.72    Jiangsu  47.44    Jiangsu  19.55    Hubei  18.38 
Shanghai  84.10    Shanghai  118.27    Shanghai  48.97    Shanghai  50.61 
Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. " … " stands for the figures inferior to....0000005. For example, a 1% increase 
of national railway and highway length in Shanghai leads to a 84.1×10
-4 increase of the growth rate of the whole 
China. Coastal provinces are marked in italic, transport hubs are marked in bold.  
 
Second, we will simulate a same increase in absolute length of railways and 
highways in each province disregarding its initial transport facility endowment. Here, 
suppose this absolute level is 1 percent of the total length of the national transport   30 
network.
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. Under this scenario, the 
increase in the length of highways (railways) can be considered equal in each province 
disregarding its initial transport facility development level and disregarding its surface.
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The results in table 6 echo that putting transportation infrastructures in coastal 
provinces have the largest impacts on encouraging national  growth. However, to 
encourage the catching-up of inland/western provinces, it is more effective to target 
infrastructure investments in central transportation hubs than to randomly allocate 
investments in western provinces.
38  
In short, our results show that, under different hypothetical scenarios, it is the 
infrastructure improvements in central transportation hubs that generate the highest 
effects on regional balanced growth; and those in coastal provinces that maximize the 
effects on national growth. 
5  Potential trade-offs between maximizing aggregate national growth 
and reducing regional disparity  
 
Infrastructure is at the core of the “Western Development Plan”. There is no doubt 
that additional infrastructure investments have beneficial effects on the western 
development. The key question here is whether putting transportation infrastructures in 
the west is the most effective infrastructure investment policies to develop the west.
39 
This section examines the effects of some alternative infrastructure investment allocation 
choices and evaluate the trade-offs between maximizing national aggregate growth and 
reducing regional disparity. 
                                                   
36 The length of the transport network is considered as the weighted average of the lengths of highways and 
railways. 
37 If under a strong assumption that the costs of building railways (highways) are similar in each province, 
this scenario actually stands for the case where a same monetary amount of infrastructure investments (in 
yuan) in each province on national growth and on regional growth. 
38 Here, the large impacts of putting infrastructures in Shanghai are closely associated with its limited 
surface (a same level of increase in transport network length implies a much higher level of increase in 
density).  
39 Given their specific characteristics, for example desserts in Xinjiang, it might not be optimum for some 
western provinces to have dense transport network.    31 
5.1 Impacts of the heavy infrastructure investments after 1999 
Four years after the implementation of the Western Development Plan, the total 
length of highways increased a third (from 131 thousand kilometres in 1999 to 175 
thousand kilometres in 2003), and the total length of railways increased a quarter (from 
5.8 thousand kilometres to 7.2 thousand kilometres). In the same period, the western 
region had witnessed a slightly higher rate of increase in the length of highways, and a 
similar rate of increase in the length of railways.  From 1999 to 2003, the total length of 
highways in the western region increased from 51 thousand kilometres to 70 thousand 
kilometres, and the total length of railways increased from 2.1 thousand kilometres to 2.7 
thousand kilometres – each represented more than 40% increase in the total length.
40 The 
investments in infrastructure have promoted local growth through various channels, such 
as through the employment creation and transport facilitation. 
How much do these heavy investments in infrastructure in the last five years 
encourage the development of the entire China and that of the western region in particular? 
How would the growth performance have been different in the absence of these heavy 
infrastructure investments? Empirical evidence suggests that transport network density in 
each province increased over time. The increase in transport network density after 2000 
consists of two parts (see the following figure): part I, the “normal” level of increase, 
which can be “predicted” by the predicted linear trend between “transport network 
density” and “year” before 1999; and part II, the “extra” level of increase, which equals 
the difference between the actually increase and the increase predicted by the linear trend 
(the distance between the rectangles that stand for the actual levels and the corresponding 






                                                   
40 Data source: China Statistical Yearbooks.   32 
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For example, in 1979, the density of transport network in Zhejiang, one of the 
rapid-growing coastal provinces, was lower than that in Hunan, one of the most important 
central transportation hubs. But the density in Zhejiang had increased much faster (graph 
9).  
Graph 9: Change in the density of transport network (1979-2003) 
Case of Zhejiang and Hunan 
Following the simulation methodologies discussed above, we examine the 
hypothetical national and regional growth in the absence of the extra investments in 
infrastructure, and compare the difference between the hypothetical scenarios and the real   33 
case.
41 In the absence of the extra investments in infrastructure in each province, the 
national growth rate would have been 1.46% lower in the period of 2000-2003 in average 
(table 7).
42 The inland/west region would have suffered slightly more from this absence 
of extra investments than the coastal region. The results suggest that the heavy 
investments in infrastructure since 1999 do have contributed to the national growth, 
although their impacts in narrowing development gap between the coastal region and the 
inland/western region are limited.
43  
However, are the impacts on the growth of the western region mainly resulted 
from the extra investments in the West? What would be the case if no extra investments 
were put in the coastal and central provinces? The results of the second part of table 7 
suggest that, if only the west region had had extra investments after 1999, the national 
growth would have been 1.42% lower in average than the real scenario, and the growth of 
the western region would have been 1.32% lower. In short, if there were no extra 
investments in the coastal and  central provinces, the growth impacts of the extra 
investments in the western region would have been negligible. In contrast, if only the 
western provinces had not had the extra investments in infrastructure, the national 
performance would not have suffered much (the third part of table 7).  In other words, to 
develop the western provinces, putting transportation infrastructures in the central and 
coastal provinces to facilitate the transaction between the west and the rest of China is a 
must. For the west to reap the full benefit, it is important that infrastructure facilities in 
the west are also improved in an appropriate way. 
                                                   
41 The relation between transport network density and year in each province differs. For some provinces, 
the relation is not strictly linear. For the reasons of simplicity, we use the provincial specific linear relations 
to “define” the “extra investment” after 2000. Regression results for each province are available upon 
request. 
42 The impacts of the “extra investments” in infrastructures in each province on the national and regional 
growth vary over time. One major reason is that such “extra investments”, measured in the length of 
highways/railways, differ by year. 
43 In the absence of the “extra investments” in infrastructures in each province, the growth rate of the 
coastal region would have been 1. 4% lower, and that of the inland/western region would have been 1.54% 
lower in the period of 2000-2003 in average (Table 7).   34 
5.2 Trade-offs between maximizing growth and reducing disparity 
Infrastructure investments represent a large proportion of government 
expenditures. It is important to allocate them in an efficient way to achieve the regional 
development goal. Would putting transportation infrastructures differently better 
encourage growth and/or reduce regional disparity? The simulation results in the previous 
section suggest that putting infrastructures in some western provinces might not have the 
optimal effects on aggregate national growth or on regional disparity. In this section, we 
will simulate two hypothetical scenarios to numerically examine the potential trade-offs 
between the effects on maximizing national growth and reducing regional disparity if the 
infrastructures were allocated differently. Scenario 1, if half of the increase in transport 
network length in the western provinces after 1999 was put into the three coastal 
provinces (Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei) where the effects on national aggregate growth 
were maximized; Scenario 2, if half of the increase in transport network length in the 
If no extra investments in infrastructures nation-wide since 2000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
National -48 -170 -179 -185 -146
Coast -45 -165 -172 -178 -140
Inland -53 -176 -191 -195 -154
West -57 -173 -191 -194 -154
If no extra investments in infrastructure in coastal and central provinces since 2000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
National -46 -166 -175 -180 -142
Coast -45 -165 -172 -178 -140
Inland -49 -167 -180 -184 -145
West -47 -150 -164 -166 -132
If no extra investments in infrastructure in western provinces since 2000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
National -2 -3 -4 -4 -3
Coast … … … … …
Inland -4 -8 -9 -9 -7
West -10 -19 -22 -23 -19
Note: Figures are presented in 1/10000. " 爡?             
example, if there is not extra investments in infrastructures nation-wide, the growth rate of the 
entire China would have been 1.85% lower than the real case in 2003. 
Table 7 Impacts on growth of extra investments in infrastructures   35 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
Nation 18.38 81.7 14.74 7.58 30.60
Coast 23.54 103.92 19.07 9.87 39.10
Inland 10.99 49.54 8.38 4.17 18.27
West 7.9 37.88 5.32 2.35 13.36
2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
Nation 6.12 31.14 5.13 2.64 11.26
Coast 2.79 14.58 2.53 1.36 5.32
Inland 10.89 55.11 8.93 4.56 19.87
West 9.9 51.39 7.29 3.43 18.00
If half of the increase in length of the transport network in the western region 
were moved to Shangdong, Jiangsu and Hebei:
If half of the increase in length of the transport network in the western region 
were moved to Hubei, Henan and Hunan:
western provinces after 1999 was put into the three central transportation hubs (Hubei, 
Henan and Hunan) where the effects on reducing regional disparity are the largest.
44  
Table 8: Impacts on national and regional growth if moving highways and railways 












Note : Figures are presented in 1/10000. For example, if half of the increase in the length of 
railways and highways in the western region were moved to Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei, it 
would have led to an 18.38×10
-4 increase in the growth rate of the whole China in 2000.  
                                                   
44 In year t  ( 1999 > t ), the “extra length”,  t v h extralengt , , of transport network length of a western 
province  v  is  t v t t v t t v t v ength predictedl a railways a highways h extralengt , , , , ) 2 1 ( − × + × = , 
where  t v ength predictedl ,  is a linear function of the highways and railways length and year before 1999 
(see note 39 and graph 9). Under the scenario that half of the increase in transport network length in the 
western provinces after 1999 was put into the three coastal provinces (Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei), the 
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network length in the western provinces after 1999 was put into the three central hubs (Hubei, Henan, and 
Hunan), the density of transport facility in a western province v , 
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The results of table 8 suggest that if half of the increase in the length of railways 
and highways in the western region were “moved” to Shandong, Jiangsu, and Hebei, the 
induced national growth rate would have been higher (for example, in 2000, it would 
have been 0.2% higher).
45 However, in this first case, a large part of the induced growth 
would have been concentrated in the coastal region, and the growth impacts on the 
western region would have been limited. If half of the increase in the length of railways 
and highways in the western region were “moved” to Hubei, Henan and Hunan, the 
induced national growth would still be positive (for example, in 2000, it would have been 
0.06% higher), although lower than the induced growth level in the scenario that the same 
mount of railways and highways were moved to the three coastal provinces. However, in 
this second case, the inland/western region would have benefited disproportionately. 
Table 9 Impacts on changes in regional disparities if moving highways and railways 
from the west to some coastal provinces and central hubs (2000-2003) 
If half of the increase in length of the transport network in the western region were 
moved to Shandong, Jiangsu and Hebei: 
Absolute change in Gini coefficient                     0.03%  0.15%  0.03%  0.02% 
Relative change in Gini coefficient                     0.12%  0.52%  0.11%  0.05% 
         
If half of the increase in length of the transport network in the western region were 
moved to Hubei, Henan and Hunan: 
Absolute change in Gini coefficient                      -0.02%  -0.11%  -0.02%  -0.01% 
Relative change in Gini coefficient                     -0.08%  -0.40%  -0.06%  -0.03% 
 
It is not surprising that moving some highways and railways from the west to the three 
coastal provinces will increase the regional disparities (upper part of table 9). What draws 
our attention is that, moving some highways and railways from the west to the three 
central transportation hubs will not only increase growth at the national level and at the 
different regional level, but also reduce regional disparities (lower part of table 9). In 
other words, relocating an appropriate amount of infrastructure investments from some 
western provinces to the central hubs will have better effects both on maximizing 
                                                   
45 The increase in the length of highways and railways in the western region differs over time, hence the 
value of the induced growth varies. For example, in 2000-2001, there was a large increase in the length of 
highways and railways in the west. If half of this increase were moved to the three coastal (or the three 
central) provinces, it would have higher effects on induced growth than in other periods.   37 
national aggregate growth and on reducing regional disparities. As illustrated earlier, the 
market access of one province depends not only on its own infrastructure development 
but also on the infrastructure development of the transit provinces.  Developing the 
infrastructure of the provinces that links many western provinces to the markets, namely, 
the transportation hubs, is an effective way to rebalance the regional economy in China. 
 
5.3 Alternative transportation infrastructure investment policies 
The development of western region may be unrealizable due to the lack of 
microeconomic  foundations if the transportation infrastructure is too poor for local 
enterprises to have the minimum demand because of market segmentation. However, we 
argue that the political inclination to western regional development does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that all infrastructure investments should be located in the western 
region. Our simulation results suggest that putting transportation infrastructures only in 
the west will suffer a large expense of efficiency lost – even if we only focus on the 
induced growth in the west, the effects are mediocre. One reason of the inefficiency of 
putting transportation infrastructures in the West is, if we improve the transport network 
in a remote province, the growth impact will be limited to that province itself and the 
other western provinces may not be able to benefit from this infrastructure improvement; 
the other reason is that if we do not improve the transport facility that links the western 
provinces to the market, the intra-province transport improvement may lead to an inward 
looking production structure, and the limited size of the local market may not be able to 
trigger or support the economy of scale. Because western provinces are underdeveloped, 
their local demands are modest and their technology and management are less advanced. 
The separation of East and West renders the investment in the West much less efficient. 
Putting transportation infrastructures in the coast have the largest impacts on 
national growth. Developing the growth poles may generate positive spillover effects and 
encourage the catching-up of the other provinces. However, further infrastructure 
developments within coastal regions may lead to the reinforcement of agglomeration, 
which will accelerate regional growth of coastal regions relative to the western ones.  
With the non-negligible multiplier effects of infrastructure investments on local economic 
development, the additional investments in the coastal provinces may aggravate the   38 
unbalanced development of China. The possible gains in economic growth may not 
always be able to justify the increasing social costs due to the widening of the regional 
gap. 
If priorities are given to reducing regional disparity, it is more advisable to locate 
infrastructure investments in the central provinces of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. 
Although they may be less developed compared with the coastal provinces, they are 
already relatively developed (in particular compared to the western provinces) at least in 
terms of transportation conditions. For the specialty of transportation infrastructure, some 
additional investments to a reasonably well-developed location generate greater positive 
effects than to less-developed places. This is not to conclude that we should neglect the 
development of remote border provinces because of their current relative less developed 
situations. What we argue here is that, it is important to develop the hubs to encourage 
the outward-looking production structure of the western region and facilitate the transfer 
of technology and management skills from more advanced regions.  
Why the development of the infrastructure network in the central provinces Hubei, 
Henan and Hunan most effectively encourage the growth of the poor western provinces? 
In short, two reasons: 1. The central provinces serve as transportation hubs with largest 
volume of traffics from the western provinces. Investing in the transport network in 
central hubs most effectively reduces the transport cost from the west to the economic 
center, the coast; 2. Infrastructure investments have large multiplier effects on local 
development, which favors the emergence of the central hubs as the future economic 
center. As suggested by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), as an economy develops, 
the effective economic area enlarges, the centrifugal forces may become stronger and 
some footloose activities may tend to move out of the original economic center to take 
advantage of the lower factor cost and to better serve the periphery (in which case, the 
economic hinterland also enlarges). Based on the balance of the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces, the new economic center tends to emerge between the original 
economic center and the periphery. In the case of China, the emergence of the new 
economic center in the central provinces, which situates between the coastal provinces 
and the western provinces, may modify the economic geographic structure of the Chinese 
economy in favor of the increased market accessibility of the western provinces.   39 
However, one potential problem that we must consider is that when we strengthen 
infrastructures, say, the transportation network, from the West to the East, we improve 
the accessibility of the eastern provinces to western markets. While this improved 
accessibility accelerates the development of the West, it has inherent risks insofar as the 
coastal and central regions can supply better goods at lower prices. For the sake of long-
term growth of the West and the entire China, some appropriate regional economic 
policies, such as appropriate regulations that reasonably protect the privileges of western 
local enterprises as infant industries, must be implemented to limit the negative effects. In 
addition, given the fact that the infrastructure development level of some western 
provinces is too poor to provide basic facilities of transportation and that infrastructure 
investment itself generates a large multiplier effect on local development, it is reasonable 
to locate some infrastructure investment there to help to break the vicious cycle. In 
particular, investments in the provinces Sichuan and Shaanxi are recommended, given 
their important role in regional development.  
6  Conclusions 
The widening regional disparity is one of the major concerns for the long-term 
sustainable development of the rapid-growing Chinese economy. The geo-economic 
remoteness to the markets lowers the growth performance and limits the development 
potentials of the lagging western region. Targeted allocation of transportation 
infrastructure investments in favor of the catching-up of the western region is important 
for the rebalance of regional development. 
The paper studies the role of transportation infrastructure investments in different 
provinces in the economic growth performance at the national and regional levels, and 
simulates the effects of hypothetical allocations of infrastructure investments. The results 
shed light on the transportation infrastructure investment policy choices – if the objective 
is to maximize the impacts on aggregate national growth, infrastructures should be 
allocated in some coastal economic centers; if the priority is to maximize the impacts on 
regional disparity reduction, infrastructures should be allocated in some central 
transportation hubs.  Without appropriate development of the transport facilities in the 
central and coastal regions, randomly putting all additional transportation investments in   40 
the West will not have optimal effects on encouraging growth or reducing disparity. 
Further investing in the coastal provinces maximizes national growth at the expense of 
widening regional disparity. To prioritize the catching-up of the western provinces 
without unnecessarily sacrificing much national growth, it is essential to target 
transportation infrastructure investments in the central transportation hubs.    41 
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Annex 2  Construction of the indicator "Peripheral Degree" 
 
The construction of the Peripheral degree of a province (province i) includes five steps: 
 
1.  For each province (noted as province v), we calculate its road density and railway density (per square 
kilometer), noted as  t v DR ,  and  t v DF ,  respectively. Then, to better reflect the importance of road 
transportation and the railway transportation, we weight them with the road transportation volume and 









t t v t t v t t v a a DF a DR a D
, ,
2 1 , 2 , 1 , × + × = + = . 
Where a1t represents the percentage of the road transportation volume and a2t represents that of the 
railway at time t. a1t+ a2t=1. 
2.  For each two provinces (province i and province j), we calculate the index of the transportation 
facility between them, noted  t ij D , . Suppose that to transport some goods from province i to province 
j, it should go through n provinces (province i and j included), we take the index  t ij D , as the simple 









3.  We define the real distance between province i and province j ( t ij Dist , ) as the weighted sum of their 
road distance ( t ij DistR , ) and railway distance ( t ij DistF , ). 
t ij t t ij t t ij DistF a DistR a Dist , 2 , 1 , + =  
4.  We define the adjusted real distance between province i and province j ( t ij DistA , ) as the result of 
their real distance divided by the index of their transportation facility. 
t ij t ij t ij D Dist DistA , , , / =  
For a given real distance, the adjusted real distance implies that, the better the transportation facility is, 
the less the adjusted distance is. The transportation facility “shortens” the economic distance between 
the two provinces by reducing the transportation cost. The adjusted real distance is a better proxy of 
the transportation cost. The shorter the adjusted real distance is, the less the trade obstacles between 
two partners and so the greater the volume of trade between them, other things being equal. The 
greater the trade volume is between two provinces, the better the market accessibility is to the other in 
the view of the province in question, and  the influence of partner province’s demand on the local 
market is greater.  
5. 
We define the peripheral degree of province i as the weighted sum of the adjusted distance between 









t ij t i GDP
GDP
DistA DP  
We weigh the adjusted distance between the province in question (i) and a coastal province ( j ) by 
the economic mass of the latter relative to that of coastal provinces in total to approximate the relative 
importance of the effective remoteness. The reason lies in that the farther away the province in 
question is from a great size coastal province, the more serious the disadvantage is that it suffers. The 
higher is the peripheral degree, the lower the economic-geographic attractiveness of the location. 
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Annex 3  Methodologies of simulations – growth impacts of changes in 
transportation network density 
 
Using the value of the peripheral degree that we have constructed with the observed values of the 
initial development level, the investment ratio, and the population growth rate, and applying the values of 
the coefficients ( t χ ζ γ θ ρ α , , , , , ) that we have estimated, we calculate the estimated value of the dependant 
variable " ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y ", noted as  t i gaes, , using the third estimation in table 3: 




t i t i t i t i
dummy




, , , 1 , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
ε χ
ζ γ θ ρ α
+ +





We then compare the difference between this original estimated value  t i gaes,  with the new estimated 
value  t i v gaes , ) (  , which is resulted from the hypothetical change of transport network density of province 
v,
46 noted as  t i t i t i gaes v gaes v gadif , , , ) ( ) ( − = . This difference captures the increase of the growth rate of 
province i in year t due to the hypothetical increase in the transportation network density of province v. 
In order to take into account the difference of the economic size of each province, we calculate the 
weighted average growth effects due to the modification of  the transport network density of province v 
( t v D , ), noted as  t v gaeff ) ( :
47 














PIB v gadif v gaeff  
Finally, to evaluate the effects of the change of  t v D ,  in each province v on the growth of different 
groups of provinces and hence on the regional balanced growth, we calculate the following ratios: 
1)  ∈ i all Chinese provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the whole Chinese 
economy due to a 10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in province v in year t , 
noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 0  
2)  ∈ i  all coastal provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the coastal region due to a 
10% increase in the density of the transportation network in province v in year t, noted as  t v gaeff ) ( 1  
                                                   
46 Under the hypothetical scenario, the transport network density of province v is modified, and the new 
value is noted as  t v v D , ) ( . We calculate a new value of  t i PD , , noted as  t i v PD , ) ( . Then we put the new 
value of  t i v PD , ) (  into the equation in replace of  t i PD ,  to  calculate the new value of the estimated 
variable " ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y ", noted as t i v gaes , ) ( .  
47 The underlying idea lies in the notion that the larger is the economic size of the province in question in 
comparison with that of the whole group, the greater are the effects of the improvement of its economic 
performance on the growth of the group. 
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3)  ∈ i  all inland provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the inland region due to a 
10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in province v  in  year  t , noted as 
t v gaeff ) ( 2  
4)  ∈ i  all western provinces,  t v gaeff ) (  stands for the growth effects on the western region due to 
a 10 percent increase in the density of the transportation network in province v  in year t , noted as 
t v gaeff ) ( 3  


































m v gaeff  
 
                                                   
48 The induced effects on the growth of different groups of provinces in each year are available upon 
request.    48 
Annex 4 Estimation of growth model  
 
The neo-classical growth model emphasizes the effects of physical investment rate and 
demographic growth rate. The higher is the ratio of physical  investment to GDP, the higher is the 
productivity of effective labor in long run equilibrium, other things being equal. Trying to explain the 
enormous contribution of fixed capital in growth, augmented Solow-Swan model argues the importance of 
human capital. The importance of the increasing return to scale renders the homogeneity of production 
function in various regions questionable, as suggested by the theory of new economic geography (Krugman, 
1991). Specialization and agglomeration amplify regional difference.
49 Other than demographic growth rate, 
Solow-Swan model argues that technologic progress rate and depreciation rate of fixed investments 
influence regional growth. However, not all parameters that condition long-term economic performance are 
available or measurable. The omission of regional specific characteristics that do not vary in time may lead 
to the bias in estimation results. Hence, panel data estimation is preferable to cross-section estimation for 
the former may capture the non-measurable specific characteristics in fixed effect model.
50 We also 
introduce year dummies to control for the short-term effects that are common to all provinces. Following 
the Barro-type framework, we introduce the “peripheral degree”, the “investment to GDP ratio”, and the 
“population growth rate” to account for the difference in the steady-state equilibrium.
51 
We start our estimation by testing the very simple hypothesis of absolute convergence (divergence) 
and estimate the following model: 
t i
t
t t t i t i t i dummy y y y ,
2002
1979
1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ ρ α ∑
=
− − + + + = −       (1) 
The first equation in table 3 shows that the initial development level " ) ln( 1 , − t i y " plays a 
significant role on regional growth.
52 As we have shown in the preceding section that geographical position, 
which represents regional market accessibility, may play an important role in influencing economic 
performance, we introduce the variable "peripheral degree", noted as  t i PD, , into our estimation:  
t i
t
t t t i t i t i t i dummy PD y y y ,
2002
1979
, 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ θ ρ α ∑
=
− − + + + + = −    (2) 
In the second equation, as predicted, the variable  t i PD,  plays a negative role on regional growth. 
The omission of this pertinent variable biases estimation results. The variable  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  continues to be 
significantly negative, which signifies conditional convergence. 
According to Solow-Swan model, we suppose that production function is of the type of Cobb-
Douglas:  
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i g n s y y y , , , , , 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε δ η γ υ ϑ + + + + + + = − − −  
where  s  stands for the ratio of physical investment to GDP; n  the population growth rate; g  the 
technology progress and δ  the depreciation rate of physical investment. Many precedent studies on 
                                                   
49 See Ricci (1999), Krugman (1995), Puga (1999), Quah (2001) and Venables (2000). 
50 The Haussman test suggests that fixed effect estimations are superior to random effect estimations. The 
limited number of observations does not allow carrying out the SURE estimations. The results of the two-
step GMM estimations with two year-lagged dependent variables as IV matrix do not suggest the 
superiority of the GMM estimations over the fixed-effects estimations. 
 
51 See Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992; 1996). 
52 Chinese provinces are heterogeneous. It is not reasonable to admit the hypothesis of their long-term 
steady state homogeneity – the premise of the existence of absolute convergence (divergence).   49 
regional growth, such as that of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), suppose that the sum of these two 
parameters is homogeneously equal to 0.05. However, in the case of China, it seems that this hypothesis is 
questionable given the fact that Chinese provinces are so different one from the others. Due to the data 
unavailability of  g  and δ , we prefer to leave their influences implicitly into fixed effects:  
t i
t
t t t i t i t i t i t i t i dummy n s PD y y y ,
2002
1979
, , , 1 , 1 , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε χ ζ γ θ ρ α + + + + + + = − ∑
=
− −  
(3) 
The significance of the demographic growth rate and the investment ratio in the third equation is 
consistent to the prediction of growth theory. Labor supply is not the major constrain of economic growth 
in China. Provinces with high physical investments and low population growth have better economic 
performance.  
 